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Abstract 
This paper explores the role of adjustment lags and labor market policies in 
the generation and perpetuation of high unemployment in Spain. A simple three equation 
model of the labor market (a labor force equation, an employment equation, and a 
wage-setting equation) is estimated using error correction techniques, allowing for lagged 
terms so as to capture dynamic adjustment effects. The results suggest that the Spanish 
labor market adjusts very slowly -it takes at least 6-8 years for unemployment to adjust 
to 90 percent of its new equilibrium level after an exogenous shock. The introduction of 
several policy-related variables into the model demonstrated a number of statistically 
significant effects of labor market policies on unemployment: I) higher social 
contributions and rising severance pay settlements significantly reduce employment;· 
2) increases in minimum wages and unemployment benefits push up real wages, while 
increased use of temporary contracts reduce them; 3) unemployment benefits also 
contribute to unemployment by encouraging higher labor force participation, while 
increased disability benefits reduce it; and 4) Labor conflictiveness (strikes) and greater 
collective bargaining reduce employment. 

LABOR MARKET POLICIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS IN SPAIN 
Jeffrey R. Franks 
No country in Europe has as great an unemployment problem as 
Spain.  From less than 5 percent in the mid-1970s, the unemployment rate 
has peaked at more than 20 percent in each of the last two economic 
slowdowns, without dropping below 15 percent in times of strong growth. 
From an analytical standpoint, the Spanish case is a fascinating, extreme 
example of the pan-European unemployment problem . From the policy 
perspective , it is essential to understand and attack labor market problems 
successfully in Spain if the unemployment crisis of the European Union 
(EU) is to be tackled, especially since the number of jobless in Spain in 
1995 was higher than in the much larger EU countries of France, Italy , 
and the United Kingdom, and nearly as high as in Germany. 
Broadly speaking , two competing schools of thought have existed in 
analyses of European unemployment over the last twenty years . One 
approach is to focus primarily on cyclical factors in generating 
unemployment, the implication being that macroeconomic shocks have 
caused unemployment to deviate from a (low) "natural" or nonaccelerating 
inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU)(I) . Studies in this vein look to a 
series of adverse macroeconomic shocks to explain the high and persistent 
unemployment rates in Europe since the 1970s. The oil crises of the 1970s 
and the recession of the early 1990s are seen as triggers for increased 
European unemployment, exacerbated by high real interest rates that 
reduced investment(2). At the other extreme is the hysteresis theory 
invoked by Blanchard and Summers (1986) and others , which argues that 
most of the unemployment increase is due to an increase in the NAIRU 
rather than in deviations therefrom . Indeed, in its most extreme form, 
Note : The author wishes to thank Brian Henry for helpful comments 
throughout the development of the paper. Discussions with the other 
participants in the unemployment project ( C .  Cristofides, K .  Habermeier, 
P .  Mauro , R .  Ramaswamy , and T. van der Willigen) were also of great 
help . L. Monasi provided research assistance on the data and M .  
Karanassou assisted with the policy simulations . All errors are my own. 
(l1Friedman (1968) coined the term "natural rate of unemployment , "  
which was subsequently used extensively i n  the so-called New Classical 
Economics school of thought . 
(2)Bianchi and Zoega (1994 ) .  
-5-
hysteresis implies that every change in unemployment becomes an 
equilibrium, as structural features of the labor market translate temporary 
shocks into permanent changes in the natural rate of unemployment . 
In Spain, where unemployment has not only shown large cyclical 
swings (rising nearly 9 percentage points during the last recession) , but 
has also demonstrated remarkable persistence at very high levels , the 
traditional NAIRU concept loses much of its usefulness. Can one really 
argue that an estimated NAIRU of 18-20 percent (as some economists have 
recently calculated) is a meaningful indication of what unemployment rate 
is "natural" for Spain? At the same time , however, the full hysteresis 
argument ignores the undeniably large cyclical movements in 
unemployment while implicitly arguing for an even higher (albeit path­
dependent) natural rate of unemployment . 
For these reasons, the analytical approach taken in this paper is 
something of an intermediate position between the extreme NAIRU view 
that unemployment has a clearly defined (relatively low) equilibrium rate 
to which it returns after macroeconomic shocks , and the extreme 
hysteresis view that unemployment is a random walk, with the equilibrium 
rate equal to the current unemployment rate in each period. A simple 
three-equation model of the labor market--a labor force equation, a wage 
determination equation, and an employment equation--is presented . By 
permitting several lags in the system of equations--and by allowing full 
interaction among the lags in the different equations--the model permits 
an examination �f the degree to which unemployment is persistent, while 
allowing the identification of the sources of persistence in the different 
equations. This model structure implicitly assumes that the true nature of 
unemployment dynamics is a subtle combination of factors generating 
persistence and forces pushing toward equilibrium. 
On the one hand , the structural nature of the system implies that 
there is indeed some underlying "equilibrium" level of unemployment in the 
economy , thus rejecting the extreme hysteresis view . On the other hand, 
by allowing for long and interactive lags, the issue of what the precise 
equilibrium rate is becomes less crucial than the structural features of the 
-6-
economy that produce the pattern of lags(3). Long lags have profound 
implications for the actual rate of unemployment; once the period of 
adjustment exceeds the average time between shocks (or the length of the 
average economic cycle), shocks can compound their effects and feed back 
on each other, generating unemployment persistence far beyond what one 
would expect from a simplistic analysis of the natural rate of unemployment 
vis-a.-vis the country's position in the economic cycle. Before one shock 
has worked its way through the labor market another has already arrived, 
producing a complex, dynamic evolution that may have little correlation 
with the underlying NAIRU. Indeed. the emphasis of the impact of labor 
market institutions on unemployment behavior focuses more on how 
structure affects the adjustment process (that is, the nature of the lags) 
than on structure as a determinant of some underlying natural 
unemployment rate. 
SPANISH LABOR MARKET SINCE THE MID-1970S 
The structure of the labor market has changed more profoundly in 
Spain than in any other Western European country in the past twenty 
years. No other country has seen its unemployment rate rise as 
dramatically and stay so persistently high. These two facts do not 
represent mere coincidence--in the profound transformation in the 
structure of employment relations (and the transformation of the Spanish 
economy more generally) lies much of the explanation for Spain's dismal 
unemployment rate. Although Spain was buffeted by the same 
macroeconomic shocks as the remainder of Europe in the 1970s, these 
shocks alone do not provide a satisfactory causal explanation of the rise 
in unemployment from less than 5 percent in 1975 to 24 percent in 1994. 
EMPLOYMENT. UNEMPLOYMENT, AND THE LABOR FORCE 
The performance of the labor market in Spain from 1975 through 1994 
can be divided into three cyclical periods. During the first period, in the 
late 19705 and early 1980s, the second oil crisis produced several years of 
weak economic growth that in turn led to a sharp decline in employment. 
(3)Karanassou and Snower (1993). 
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The unemployment rate rose sharply, rising from 7 percent in 1978 to over 
20 percent in 1984, while the size of the labor force was relatively 
stagnant, growing at an average rate of only 0. 5 percent a year. Despite 
the increase in unemployment, real wages continued to rise at nearly 
1 percent a year. 
The second period began in 1985, with Spain's preparations to enter 
the European Community (EC). Sparush accession to the EC (in 1986) 
sparked a major economic recovery, with growth averaging 4. 5 percent a 
year during 1986-90. This expansion, plus the Government's introduction 
of flexible temporary labor contracts in 1984 (see next section), fueled an 
increase in employment averaging 3 percent a year. The unemployment 
rate fell from over 21 percent in 1985 to 16 percent in 1990. This drop in 
unemployment was smaller than might be expected from such strong 
employment growth as the result of a sharp acceleration in the growth of 
the labor force to 2. 1 percent a year, primarily because of a significant 
increase in the participation rate for women. Real wage growth continued, 
albeit at the slower pace of 0. 6 percent a year. 
The overall changes in employment and unemployment do not do 
justice to the depth of the changes in the labor market, because they mask 
a profound shift in the nature of employment. The progressive opening of 
the economy accelerated a major transformation in the economic structure 
that had already begun in the 1970s. The role of agriculture and basic 
industry (for example, coal, steel, and shipbuilding) declined sharply, 
while modern industry and the services sector (particularly tourism and 
financial services) surged(4). 
The economy slowed in 1991 and entered into recession in the second 
half of 1992. The unemployment rate climbed rapidly to 24. 6 percent by the 
third quarter of 1994--a peak-to-trough variation of more then 
8 percentage points in less than three years. While labor force growth 
decelerated (to an average of 0. 7 percent), most of the increase in 
unemployment came from a sharp drop in labor demand. Employment fell by 
("See Franks (1994) for a detailed discussion of the effects of these 
structural changes on the labor market in Spain. 
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7 percent between 1991 and 1994. Until labor market reforms began to bite 
in 1994, real wages continued an unabated rise despite the enormous slack 
in the labor market. 
STRUCTURE OF THE LABOR MARKET 
During the Franco period, Spain had a rigidly controlled labor 
market. Trade union activism was prohibited and the social security 
benefits of the modern welfare state were largely nonexistent. In their 
place was a set of labor regulations that rigidly defined working conditions 
and provided social protection by making it difficult to fire workers and 
providing generous severance pay for dismissals. 
After General Franco's death in 1975 J the country underwent a major 
economic transformation that paralleled the political transition to 
democracy. The economy modernized rapidly, with sharp declines in 
traditional agricultural and basic industrial activity and the rise of modern 
manufacturing and services. The economy also opened to further 
international competition, culminating in accession to the EC in 1986. 
Similarly profound changes occurred in the labor market, affecting 
every aspect of labor relations. The tight regulations on working 
conditions with their attendant restrictions on geographical and functional 
mobility were continued, but they were combined with the labor relations 
systems and the social protection of a modern welfare state. Trade unions 
became both legal and extremely active. Although union membership 
remains relatively low J the coverage of union-negotiated agreements was 
well in excess of 80 percent of all salaried workers by the late 1980s. After 
a series of national wage pacts in the late 1970s that kept industrial action 
and wage increases under control, collective bargaining moved largely to 
the sectoral level. Union activism surged, with Spain consistently among 
the European countries with the largest number of days lost to strike 
activity. 
While the legal structure of dismissals did not change radically from 
the Franco era, the effective real costs of dismissals rose owing to the 
unions' ability to negotiate collectively for better severance payments and 
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owing to government-supported schemes to support workers on temporary 
redundancies and to help pay severance costs of those permanently 
dismissed. Average severance payments grew from just over 4.5 months 
of pay in 1981 to over 12 months of pay by 1993. 
To this severance system was added an increasingly complete social' 
protection system providing relatively generous unemployment benefits for 
dismissed workers and pensions for those injured J disabled J or retiring. 
Whereas in 1983-84 fewer than 30 percent of nonagricultural workers were 
eligible for unemployment compensation, by 1993 over 60 percent were 
receiving compensation. The size of unemployment benefits also grew 
substantially. Benefits per unemployed person grew by 30 percent in real 
terms between 1984 and 1993. These high benefit levels reflected a system 
under which workers were entitled to unemployment compensation with a 
generous replacement ratio of the previous salary J particularly during the 
first year of joblessness. The period of work required to become eligible 
for benefits was also quite short--six months of work entitled one to three 
months of benefits, with the same 2: 1 ratio holding for longer periods on 
the job. 
Not all developments in the 1980s increased the rigidity of the labor 
market. Whereas during the 19705 the minimum wage grew by 55 percent 
in real terms (an average real growth rate of 4.5 percent a year) J that 
growth leveled off in the early 1980s, and there was actually a 6 percent 
real decline in the level of the minimum wage by 1990. In 1984, in response 
to the sharply rising unemployment rate J the Government liberalized the 
use of temporary contractsJ permitting temporary workers (on contracts 
of up to three years) to do essentially the same work as permanent 
workers. Because temporary workers were not subject to the same hiring 
and firing conditions and their contracts effectively granted the firms 
greater functional and geographical mobility, this step significantly 
reduced rigidities for those firms using temporary workers. The growing 
number of temporary workers increased the dualism of the labor market, 
as the labor force became increasingly segregated into permanent and 
temporary "castes." 
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As the Spanish economy slowed in 1991 and 1992 and unemployment 
again soared above 20 percent, it became increasingly clear that the labor 
market was in need of more profound reforms. In 1993 and 1994, the 
Government undertook a series of reforms designed to reduce 
unemployment compensation, facilitate workplace mobility, and reduce 
firing costs. Early results of these reforms appear to be favorable, but 
given the long response time in the labor market, it is premature to 
evaluate whether they will make a major contribution to the reduction of 
unemployment over the medium and long term. 
In summary, the analysis of the causes of high and persistent 
unemploy-ment in Spain must look to the interaction of two sets of factors. 
First, at the macroeconomic level, profound changes in the structure of 
the economy as a whole (opening to international trade, accession to the 
EU, the decline of agriculture and basic industry, and the rise of modern 
manufacturing and services) as well as sociodemographic changes in the 
size of the working-age population and the rise of female participation in 
the labor force have affected the labor market at least as profoundly as the 
macroeconomic shocks of the oil crises and the rise in real interest rate 
that are often cited as the source of European unemployment(5). Second, 
at the level of the labor market itself, Spain has experienced profound 
changes in the structure of labor market institutions that could have a 
major impact on the level and persistence of unemployment. During the 
past twenty years, Spain has seen the resurgence of trade union activism 
and the rise of the protection of a modern social welfare state and has 
reformed the legal framework for the labor market. 
BASIC MODEL 
In this section, a basic three-equation labor market model is 
constructed and estimated for 1971-93. It contains variables designed to 
measure the interactions between labor supply, labor demand, and real 
wages. In keeping with the focus on examining not just the equilibrium 
relationship J but also the adjustment process, each equation uses a set of 
(S)See Bean (1994) for a review of explanations of European 
unemployment. 
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lags on both the dependent and independent variables to capture the 
dynamics of the labor market. This model will be used to determine the 
basic rela-tionships among the key variables, as well as to pinpoint 
structural breaks that could be identified with known changes in labor 
market institutions. Unfortunately, good time-series data on many 
important policy variables over the entire sample period are lacking, so 
the estimations over this period are conducted using a simple specification. 
Making virtue out of necessity, however, these results provided 
interesting contrasts with those of the policy model estimated over the 
19805 and 1990s as described in the next section. 
STRUCTURE 
The empirical specifications used here are based on an underlying 
right-to-manage type of wage and employment setting process(6). 
Potential workers decide unilaterally whether or not to enter the labor 
market based on the wage they can get if employed. the probability of 
employment, and sociodemographic factors exogenous to the model. To 
incorporate adjustment lags, lagged values on both the endogenous and 
the exogenous variables are permitted. Thus, the labor supply equation 
is as follows: 
In LF, = a +L I.\;DR,.... +L yjln WH +L 6jln LF/-i + EljX, + E, (1) 
i..o i.() i_I 
where LF is the labor force, Y[ is the real wage, UR is the unemployment 
rate, and � is a vector of variables exogenous to the model that could 
affect the labor supply. For the basic version of the model estimated in 
this section, the only exogenous variable included is the working-age 
population. 
The real wage is a variable jointly determined by bargaining between 
employers and trade unions. This bargain is affected by past real wages, 
by the unemployment rate, by labor productivity, and by a vector of 
(�See Booth (1995) pp. 124-28 for an exposition of the right-to-manage 
model. Oswald and Turnbull (1985) provide empirical evidence in support 
of the right-to-manage assumption for the United Kingdom. 
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exogenous variables (such as the reservation wage determined by 
unemployment bene-fits). The empirical specification of the real wage 
equation is as follows: 
In W{ = a +L �,.uR{ ... j +L6,ln W{o1 + L Piin il-1 + a/x{ + E, (2) 
ioO i.\ 1.0 
where Prod is labor productivity. For the basic version of the model 
estimated in this section, the only exogenous variable included is the 
minimum wage, under the assumption that minimum wage increases may 
have played a role in setting expectations for wage increases in the private 
sector(7\ . 
In accordance with the right-to-manage literature, once wages are 
determined in collective bargaining, employers are assumed to be free to 
set employment levels so as to maximize profits subject to the legal and 
institutional constraints of the Spanish labor market. Employment thus 
depends on past employment, real product wages (that is, the real wage 
of the worker plus social contributions paid by the employer), and a 
vector of exogenous variables as follows: 
In E, = a +L �iln Worr,p, .. +1: 6,ln E,...,. a,x, + E, 
1.0 i.\ 
(3) 
(7Minimum wages may not be a completely exogenous variable, because 
there is often an implicit or explicit linkage between average wages and the 
setting of the minimum wage. In Spain, there appears to have been some 
effort to maintain the minimum wage as a share of the average wage in the 
mid-1970s, but not since then. Nevertheless, in the estimation of the 
model, the minimum wage variable was included with a lag to avoid a 
possible simultaneity problem. See Dolado and others (1996) for an in­
depth discussion of the effect of minimum wages on employment. 
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where � represents employment, and !t",p is the wage paid by the 
employer(S). For the empirical specification in this section, the only 
"exogenous" variable included is GDP. 
and 
The model is closed by the following identities: 
W�",p = W + T.so<SeI;' 
UR 
In II 
E 1-_, 
LF 
In E 
--, 
GDP 
( 4) 
(5) 
(6) 
where � are social security taxes paid by the employer(9). As shown 
in equation (5) ,  the unemployment rate term in the labor force and real 
wage equations indirectly incorporates the effects of employment on labor 
supply and of employment and labor supply on real wages. Although GDP 
is not explicitly modeled, it is treated as an endogenous variable and a 
simple GDP equation is included in the simulations in the section Structural 
Change and Unemployment: Persistence and Responsiveness . 
'''This employer wage is not a fully fledged product wage because for 
simplicity it is deflated by the consumer price index (CPl) rather than by 
some producer price index. Nevertheless, because the cpr and producer 
prices are highly correlated, the results differ little if a pure product 
wage is used . 
(9}While for the basic model in this section the model results are 
reported for the employers' wage as a whole, in the policy model in the 
following section, the wage and security contribution variables are 
included separately, allowing their coefficients to differ. 
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CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DATA 
The empirical analysis was conducted using quarterly data from 1971 
through 1994(\0). The data were obtained from the databases of the Bank 
of Spain, the Ministry of Economy, and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). For GDP data, for which quarterly 
information was not available for the entire period, interpolations 
developed by the OEeD were used. The data are not seasonally adjusted; 
rather J seasonal dummies are included in all of the regressions. All 
variables, except for the unemployment rate, are in logs. 
The most important feature of the variables under consideration is 
their stationarity (or lack thereof). Hysteresis theories of unemployment 
imply that unemployment is a nonstationary variable, raising the issue of 
nonstationarity of both employment and unemployment. An essential first 
step was to examine the variables to be used for the existence of unit 
roots. The results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests on the 
variables to be included in the model in levels suggested that essentially 
all should be treated as nonstationary. From unit root test on the 
differenced variables, it appears that they may be treated as 1(1) . 
ESTIMATION RESULTS 
After initial exploratory regressions in ordinary least squares 
(OLS), the model was estimated as an autoregressive distributed lag 
(ARDL) model in levels using instrumental variables (IV) in order to find 
a cointegrating long-run relationship{II). The model was then estimated 
in error correction formulation in differences using instrumental variables 
when necessary to control for endogeneity(l2). In estimation, a strictly 
(lO)Owing to the lag structure incorporated into the estimates and the 
missing data for some variables, the estimates were generally done for 
1972-93 . 
(lI'Pesaran and Shin (1995) . 
(I2)The preferred specification was also estimated simultaneously using 
full information maximum likelihood (FIML) techniques to compare with the 
instrumental variables results. The FIML results did not differ 
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empirical approach was taken to the structure of the lags . Up to eight lags 
of each endogenous variable were included in initial specifications, with 
only lags with robust significance being retained in the chosen 
specifications . In this respect, the model differs from a structural vector 
autoregression (VAR) model--where all variables would contain the same 
number of lags--because only significant lags were retained in the final 
specifications. Chow tests were undertaken to test for structural breaks 
in the model, and in preparation for estimating the policy model in this 
section, the basic model was estimated separately for the two subperiods 
of 1971-80 and 1981-93. 
In addition to an examination of the regression coefficients of the 
error correction model, diagnostics are presented to analyze the dynamic 
response of each estimated equation to changes in explanatory variables 
and to shocks . A series of diagnostic statistics on the dynamics is also 
calculated . First, the "cross-persistence" of temporary shocks and the 
"cross-responsiveness" to permanent shocks of each equation are 
examined, building on the measures of persistence and responsiveness for 
unemployment developed by Snower and Karanassou (1995). These 
measures basically measure the sum of the deviations of the dependent 
variable from its equilibrium; in other words, they are a normalized 
version of the integral of the impulse response curve . The measures used, 
and how they differ from those developed by Snower and Karanassou, are 
discussed in detail in the appendix . Second, information on the "half-life" 
of impulse responses is presented . The half-life of a permanent change is 
defined as the time required for one-half the change to be transmitted 
through to the dependent variable. For a temporary shock, the half-life 
is the time required for the dependent variable to reach one-half its 
maximum deviation and its original and final value. 
LABOR FORCE EQUATION 
Economic models of the labor force are notoriously difficult, because 
many noneconomic factors affect labor force participation. The results 
substantially from those of the IV error correction model (ECM) 
specification reported below. 
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presented here are no exception. Table 1 shows the long-run cointegrating 
relationships of the model, while Table 2 presents the preferred specifi­
cation for the labor force equation in error correction form. The long-run 
relationship shows a positive coefficient on the working-population vari­
able, but a negative one on the real wage. While somewhat surprising, the 
negative relationship is not inconsistent with rational utility maximization 
in the decision to participate in the labor force, as higher wages among 
primary wage earners may lead secondary household members to 
participate less through an income effect(Il). The unemployment rate does 
not figure in the long-run relationship, because its coefficient was not 
robustly significant and the equation failed to cointegrate when it was 
included. 
Turning to the error correction specification, several features of 
the regression results stand out. First, it is interesting that the 
coefficient on the error correction term, while significant and carrying the 
correct sign, is quite small, implying relatively slow adjustment to the 
long-run relationship. Second, unemployment, which did not participate 
in the long- run relationship, plays a dynamic role. Lagged changes in 
unemployment on balance have a slightly negative effect on labor force 
participation growth, as do lagged changes in the rate of labor force 
growth. Although these results are not as strong as one would like, both 
the ARDL regressions producing the long-run cointegrating relationships 
and the error correction model regressions pass standard tests for 
{1l)Interestingly, when the sample is split and the same regression is 
run separately over 1972-80 and 1981-93, the negative relationship 
between wages and labor force participation disappears, particularly for 
the second half of the sample, implying that there may have been an 
exogenous change in the social attitudes regarding households' work­
leisure trade-off. Indeed, exogenous shifts in the labor force 
participation of women would have precisely the effect of shifting the 
quantity of labor offered by the household at a given income level. Thus, 
while in the early period, households may have been at or close to the 
backward-bending section of their labor supply curves, exogenous 
changes in female participation made the elasticity of the labor supply to 
the real wage highly positive in the 19805 and 19905. 
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misspecification, autocorrelation, normality of the errors, and 
heteroscedasticity(l4) . 
A clearer idea of the overall impact of the different explanatory 
vari-ables on the labor force can be obtained by examination of the 
indicators of equation dynamics presented in Table 3. As can be seen, 
permanent wage and population shocks take a long time to manifest their 
full effects on the equilibrium labor force. For a real wage shock, after 8 
quarters only one-half of the final effect has been transmitted, while for 
a population. shock, it takes 35 quarters. A onetime shock to the labor 
force itself will be reversed over time as the long-run equilibrium 
relationship reasserts itself, but this process is a long one. It takes 
13 quarters for one-half of the adjustment to occur . The data on 
responsiveness show that the accumulated deviations from long-run 
equilibrium from permanent changes are quite significant in the case of 
real wages, where the difference between the long-run equilibrium labor 
force and the sum of the actual values is 2.6 percent . 
Temporary shocks to wages and unemployment have relatively small 
maximum effects on the labor force, while a (totally unrealistic) temporary 
jump in the working-age population has a large temporary effect on the 
labor force. Of course, because the unemployment rate is not in the long­
run relationship, it has only temporary effects. In all of these cases, it 
takes one to two years for the effects of these temporary shocks to dampen 
down to half their maximum level. A temporary shock to the labor force 
itself has a half-life of 14 quarters. 
Chow tests on the labor force equation show clear evidence of 
structural breaks, so the model was re-estimated for the sample divided 
at 1981. Both halves of the sample now show a negative relationship 
between wages and labor force participation, as well as a negative link 
''''The following tests were performed in PC-Give on both the ARDL 
specification and on the error correction equation: the Lagrange 
multiplier test for ,!!th order autocorrelation; the Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedastic (ARCH) test; the X: test for normality of the 
residuals; the X: test for heteroscedasticity and correct functional form; 
and the Ramsey regression specification (RESET) test . 
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between unemployment and labor force participation. There was also an 
important drop in the coefficient on the error correction term between the 
first and second half of the sample, suggesting a lengthening of the time 
required for the labor force to adjust to shocks. 
REAL WAGE EQUATION 
The long-run cointegrating relationship for real wages (Table 1) 
shows a strongly positive relationship between real wages and labor 
productivity, as one would expect. Unemployment has a small negative 
impact on wages that is only marginally significant statistically, 
suggesting that wages are largely insensitive to labor market conditions. 
There is a strong correlation between minimum wages and average wages 
in the long run, which, although it may be a statistical artifact, may also 
indicate that general wage increases follow trends set in increases in the 
minimum wage. 
The error correction specification (Table 4) also shows a 
significantly positive relationship between productivity growth and w�ge 
growth. The relationship with the minimum wage also remains positive in 
differences. Changes in the unemployment rate fail to be significant and 
are excluded from the preferred specification. Lagged changes in the real 
wage exert a strongly negative effect on wage growth in the current 
period, reflecting a strong tendency to revert to trend after variations in 
wage growth rates. The coefficient on the error correction term is highly 
significant and relatively large. As was the case with the labor force 
variable, there is clear evidence of structural breaks in the equation, but 
other specification tests are passed. 
Table 5 indicates that, as expected from the higher coefficient on 
the error correction term, the adjustment to a permanent shock is faster 
in the wage equation than in the labor force equation. Productivity shocks 
are the slowest in transmission into wages, with a half-life of more than 
three years. This lag is also reflected in the large negative responsiveness 
number, which indicates a cumulative deviation of -21 percent in wages 
after a productivity shock from the new equilibrium wage. Temporary 
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shocks in the wage equation work themselves out relatively quickly , with 
half-lives of five quarters or less from shocks in all of the variables. 
EMPLOYMENT EQUATION 
The long-run employment equation is presented in Table 1. As 
expected, it shows a strongly positive relationship between GDP and 
employment (although the fact that the coefficient is larger than 1 is 
surprising) .  The product wage has the expected negative effect on 
employment, with a relatively large coefficient of -0. 33. 
The preferred specification for the error correction form of the 
model is presented in Table 6. Changes in GDP growth have a positive 
impact on employment growth. On balance, the evolution of the real 
product wage has a positive impact as well, in contrast to the long-run 
relationship . On balance, lagged values of the dependent variable have a 
slightly negative impact , with a long adjustment process implied (the sixth 
lag proves to be significant) .  The error correction term is significant and 
correctly signed , but the coefficient is quite small (only 0.1) , which means 
that the adjustment to long-term equilibrium is quite weak . As with the 
other two equations , there is strong evidence of structural breaks in the 
model, but other statistical tests are passed , indicating no major problems 
with autocorrelation , heteroscedasticity , or misspecification of the 
equations. 
The dynamic of the employment equation is intermediate between the 
relatively quick adjustment displayed by the real wage equation and the 
slow adjustment of the labor force equation . As can be seen from Table 7, 
half-life adjustments to shocks generally take one and a half to two and a 
half years , with the adjustment to output shocks somewhat quicker. Of 
particular interest is the dynamic of an adjustment in the product wage, 
which, despite its large long-term effect, demonstrates relatively slow 
adjustment to shocks . The responsiveness to permanent shocks is 
particularly poor. 
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RESULTS OF THE BASIC MODEL 
The evidence of structural breaks in the equations , together with 
the unexpected negative relationship between wage and labor force 
participation, suggests that the exact results of this preliminary analysis 
should be interpreted with caution . Nevertheless, the results are strong 
enough to warrant several interesting qualitative conclusions. The most 
telling of these is the evidence that long lags in the adjustment of the labor 
market to shock play a crucial role in sustaining high unemployment . The 
half-life numbers presented suggest that it takes between 3 and 35 
quarters for one-half of the final effect of a permanent shock in an 
explanatory variable to be felt in the corresponding dependent variable. 
The numbers are even more striking as regards the time taken for 
90 percent adjustment. For example, a permanent output shock takes over 
six years to manifest 90 percent of its final effect on employment; a 
permanent working- population shock (for example, the Spanish baby 
boom) takes 63 quarters (15.75 years) to manifest 90 percent of its final 
effect on the labor force; a permanent wage shock takes four years to 
show 90 percent of its final effect on the wages themselves, over eight 
years to show 90 effect on employment , and nearly ten years for the labor 
force equation. While the exact values of these lags should not be relied 
upon, they are broadly consistent with other recent work on adjustment 
lags in Spain (15) and clearly justify the conclusion that adjustment is 
extremely slow. Chart 1 shows graphically the adjustment process for some 
of these key permanent shocks to give an idea of the full dynamics of 
adjustment in each equation. 
The second interesting insight from the basic model is the striking 
lack of sensitivity of the labor market to the unemployment rate.  
Unemployment has no long-run and little short-run impact on the labor 
force and has a minuscule effect on real wages , suggesting that the labor 
i1"Dolado and Lopez-Salido (1996) use a conventional VAR approach to 
look at the response of output, unemployment , and wages to different 
types of macroeconomic shocks . Their results indicate that the half-life 
adjustment of these variables is on the order of three to five years . As 
with the results obtained here, the adjustment to labor supply shocks 
tends to be even slower. 
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market does not contain a strong self-correcting tendency in the face of 
high unemployment . 
Even in this basic model J sociodemographic factors and policies and 
institutions of the labor market itself play a very important role in labor 
market outcomes . The increase in the working-age population coupled with 
changes in attitudes toward female labor force participation, which 
produce a coefficient on the population variable that is larger than unity J 
have clearly contributed to the rise in unemployment. In the two policy 
variables included in the basic model (the minimum wage and the tax wedge 
of social security contributions) J there is strong evidence that 
institutional factors have also played an important role in pushing up 
product wages and reducing employment. 
Finally J the instability of the coefficients of the basic model 
highlights the importance of structural changes in the labor market in 
Spain . This phenomenon will be explored in more detail in the next 
section . .  
POLICY MODEL 
The results of the basic model, while providing some general 
information about the behavior of the Spanish labor market J are 
unsatisfactory for several reasons. First , the model is econometrically 
deficient owing to clear structural breaks (undoubtedly produced by the 
changes in the structure of the labor market since the early 1970s ) . 
Second , from a more conceptual standpoint , the basic model does not 
explain well the causes of Spanish unemployment. The institutional 
features of the labor market discussed as potential factors in generating 
high unemployment are not really modeled.  These weaknesses motivate the 
development of another version of the model, where the structural 
problems and unanswered causal questions of the basic model can be 
addressed. 
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ADDITIONAL VARIABLES 
The "policy" model has the same general form as the basic model but 
with the addition of a series of variables designed to capture explicitly 
some of the institutional features of the labor market that could have 
played a role in generating persistent unemployment in Spain . Including 
these aspects of the labor market structure makes the model less 
susceptible to structural breaks in the coefficients.  The model is estimated 
only for 1981-93; this shorter time series also makes it less likely to suffer 
from structural breaks than the 1972-93 period used in the basic model, 
because it excluded the Franco era and democratic transition in the 19705. 
However, this restricted sample has the disadvantage of excluding the 
initial rise in unemployment in the wake of the oil shocks of 1973-74 and 
1979-80, but the data for most of the key policy variables included do not 
reach back into the 1970s . 
The basic labor force equation in the policy model includes two 
variables in addition to those in the basic model--the average level of 
disability pensions and the replacement ratio of unemployment 
compensation.  Disability pensions would be expected to decrease the labor 
force directly because people granted disability benefits leave the labor 
force, but, in addition ,  a negative relationship is to be expected between 
the level of benefits and the labor force because some firms in Spain have 
used pensions as an alternative to redundancies . The disability pension 
variable may also capture some of the effect of retirement pensions on the 
labor force(16) . The inclusion of the replacement ratio variable reflects 
the incentives a person may have to remain in the labor force (or enter) 
despite high unemployment . High unemployment benefits could prevent 
(16)Controls on disability pensions were fairly weak until the 19905; 
there is substantial anecdotal evidence of firms using temporary disability 
classifications of workers as an alternative to redundancies for younger 
workers. For older workers, early retirements were often used with 
official acquiescence. This effect may also be captured by the disability 
pension variable. 
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discouraged workers from leaving the labor force or could provide 
incentives for. entering the labor market(l7). 
The wage equation includes two new policy-related variables--the 
replacement ratio of unemployment benefits and the share of temporary 
workers in the labor force. The replacement ratio reflects the reservation 
wage of workers, and hence should have a positive impact on collectively 
bargained wages. It is not clear ex ante whether the presence of 
temporary workers would increase or decrease average wages. On the one 
hand, because temporary workers tend to be paid less than their 
permanent counterparts, there is a composition effect that would cause the 
average wage to decline as the share of temporary workers increases. On 
the other hand, the presence of temporary workers may exacerbate 
insider-outsider problems by making permanent workers less susceptible 
to redundancies (see Bentolila and Dolado ( 1994) ; Jimeno and Toharia 
(1993 ) ) .  Finally. the minimum wage is included as with the basic model. 
In estimating the employment equation, three policy variables were 
added to the variables included in the basic model. Two relate to labor 
market relations between worker and employers, one measuring days Lost 
to strike action and the other measuring the coverage of trade union 
agreements. The strike activity variable reflects a clear nonwage cost to 
employers that could negatively affect their level of employment. The 
coverage of union agreements may also affect employment Levels by 
constituting a direct labor cost, or, through wages, an indirect cost. The 
third policy variable, severance pay, measures the real value of severance 
pay settlements as a means of exploring the impact of dismissal costs on 
employment levels. In addition, in order to examine the effect of 
government policies on labor market taxation, the product wage variable 
has been split into its constituent parts--a real social contribution costs 
variable (TSS) and the real wage as perceived by employees. 
(L1)First-time entrants into the labor force are not eligible for 
unemployment benefits. Nevertheless, the future availability of 
unemployment benefits will certainly have a positive impact on the 
expected value of entering the labor force, especially since there has been 
a large amount of rotation between temporary jobs and unemployment since 
temporary contracts were liberalized in 1984. 
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ESTIMATION RESULTS 
As with the model in the previous section, the policy model was 
initially explored in OLS, with regressions subsequently run in error 
correction form using, where necessary J instrumental variables and 
including cointegrating long-run relationships . The long-run relationships 
are shown in Table 8 ,  with the error correction models of the individual 
equations shown in Tables 9-11 . 
LABOR FORCE EQUATION 
As seen in Table 8 ,  wages and the labor force show a significant 
positive relationship in the long-run, in contrast to the negative sign 
given in the basic model. The idea that higher wages draw more labor 
force participation is more intuitively satisfactory than the negative sign 
found previously . The positive long-run relationship between working-age 
population and the labor force is also strongly significant, as expected . 
The fact that the size of the coefficient is even larger than in the basic 
model probably reflects the accelerating trend of the incorporation of 
women into the labor force in the 1980s compared with the 19705 . Turning 
to the policy' variables, there is a small but significant positive effect of 
the replacement ratio on labor force participation, while the generosity of 
disability pension benefits holds the expected negative correlation with 
participation. The unemployment rate showed no significant relationship, 
and was excluded from the preferred specification(lB). 
The error correction version of the model is shown in Table 9 .  Wage 
growth has the expected significant positive effect on the labor force.  The 
two policy variables also hold significant signs in the expected direction, 
with increasing disability pensions decreasing the labor force, while the 
growth replacement ratio increases it. The error correction term also has 
the expected sign. In contrast, short-run fluctuations in the working-age 
population paradoxically decrease the labor force . As in the basic model, 
changes in the unemployment rate have virtually no net effect . 
(l8)1t should be noted, however, that the long-run regressions do not 
unambiguously cointegrate . See'the footnote to Table 8. 
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An examination of the summary statistics on equation dynamics in 
Table 1 2  shows that the half-lives of the responses to permanent shocks 
are smaller than those for the basic model, while the speed of adjustment 
to temporary shocks is somewhat longer . The speed of adjustment to 
shocks in the labor force itself seems to have improved significantly . This 
phenomenon appears for all of the policy model equations } as well as for 
the dynamics of the system as a whole (see section on structural change 
and unemployment) .  This apparent improvement should not, however, be 
interpreted as reflecting better real adjustment ; rather, the structural 
variables included reduce the coefficients on the lagged dependent 
variables because they are accounting for some of the causes of delayed 
adjustment(19) . 
REAL WAGE EQUATION 
The long-run determinants of wages (Table 8) show the expected 
strong positive correlation between productivity and wage growth . In 
contrast to the basic model, the coefficient is less than one, implying that 
not all productivity improvements are translated into wages . This result 
is consistent with the general increase in profit margins experienced in 
Spain in the 1980s. Unemployment has a significantly negative effect on 
wages , although the size of the effect is small . The minimum wage 
(l9}In the basic model, own variable persistence and responsiveness 
measures capture the adjustment effects of the structural features of the 
labor market that are separately modeled in the policy model. To illustrate 
this effect, consider the comparison between a simple autoregression 
versus an autoregressive equation with additional structural variables . 
If one calculates the adjustment speed of the simple autoregressive model 
compared with the model that includes structural variables, the 
autoregressive model will necessarily show slower adjustment ( that is , 
higher coefficients on the lagged terms) because the autoregressive terms 
are picking up some of the effects of the persistence of the omitted 
structural variables . One should not , however, conclude that the impulse 
response functions shown in the basic model are useless because they come 
from a model that suffers from omitted variable bias and is therefore 
misspecified. By that criterion ,  virtually every VAR would also be 
classified as useless as a result of misspecification because V ARs do not 
include potentially important structural variables . Rather, the impulse 
response functions should be seen as illustrative of the adjustment time 
required as a result of a shock given the "average" underlying levels of 
the structural variables over the period of the regression. 
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continues to have a positive effect on real wages j however, the size of this 
pass-through effect is smaller than in the basic model. Turning to the 
policy variables introduced in this version of the model, increases in the 
replacement ratio increase wages as expected. Interestingly, the share of 
temporary workers in the labor force on balance exerts a moderating effect 
on wages, suggesting that the composition effect of lower wages paid to 
temporary workers dominates the insider-outsider effect that more 
temporary workers could have on wage bargaining. 
The error correction version of the real wage equation, shown in 
Table 1 0 ,  provides' stronger results than those of the labor force equation. 
R eal wage increases tend to perpetuate themselves into the future, as 
demonstrated by the net positive impact lagged wage growth has on 
current wage increases. The error correction coefficient is large and 
highly significant, suggesting a rapid adjustment to the long-run real 
wage path. Changes in the replacement ratio have a significantly positive 
impact on wage growth, as in the long-run relationship. The share of 
temporary workers in the workforce has a short-run positive effect 
compared with its long-run negative effect. C hanges in the unemployment 
rate, in productivity, and in the minimum wage have short-run effects 
that also run counter to their long-run relationship with real wages. 
Unemployment growth lagged one quarter is positively linked to wage 
increases, while the coefficient on lagged productivity is of only marginal 
significance statistically. 
As with the lab or force equation, the real wage equation of the 
policy model shows faster adjustment than with the basic model, as 
demonstrated by the shorter half-lives and less negative responsiveness 
numbers (see Table 1 3 ) . This is particularly true of the response of the 
real wage to a real wage shock. Temporary shocks, in contrast, tend to 
have longer half- lives than in the basic model. This is a result of the 
functional form of the equation, which induces a behavior that oscillates 
around the final values. These oscillations take time to settle down, hence 
the long half- lives despite small net persistence statistics. 
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EMPLOYMENT EQUATION 
One of the most striking results of the long-run regression on the 
employment equation is the weakness of the relationship between wages 
and employment ( Table 8 ) .  Although the variable has the expected 
negative sign (unlike in the basic model) ,  it is not significantly different 
from zero according to standard t-tests . Social security contributions , in 
contrast ,  demonstrate a strongly negative effect on employment . GDP 
holds a positive relationship with employment of approximately one to one, 
implying little or no long-run labor productivity growth. The three policy­
related variables included in the regression all maintain a significant 
relationship with employment. Severance pay is negatively related with 
employment, as is strike activity . The coverage of collective bargaining 
agreements is also related negatively with employment . 
The error correction version of the employment equation is 
presented in Table 1 1 .  As with the real wage equation, the errOr 
correction term is large and highly significant . Changes in employment 
tend to persist over time, as evidenced by the positive net relationship 
between current employment growth and its lagged values. Social security 
taxes retain the negative relationship with employment in differences that 
they have in the long-run regression, while wages have a very small 
negative effect on employment growth . GDP growth has an unexpected 
negative relationship with employment growth over the short run . Changes 
in the coverage of collective bargaining agreements have a negative impact 
on employment growth, while strike action has a very small positive effect . 
Severance pay was not significant in the short-run regressions and was 
excluded from the preferred specification. 
Table 14 shows a faster speed of adjustment in the policy model 
compared with that of the employment equation in the basic model . The 
time for one-half of the adjustment is less than one and a half years , 
although the oscillations in employment caused by shocks in several of the 
explanatory variables (for example, social security taxes , collective 
bargaining, and strike days) led to considerable overshooting that is not 
reflected in the summary statistics . 
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RESULTS OF THE POLICY MODEL 
One important conclusion of the three equations in the policy model 
is that labor market structure does indeed play an important role in the 
underlying long-run equilibria of employment , real wages,  and the labor 
force , as well as in the dynamics. In addition to confirming that increases 
in the minimum wage appear to contribute to upward pressure on overall 
real wages,  there is also evidence that other key social and labor market 
policies of the government affect employment, wages,  and the labor force . 
The policy effects can be summarized as follows: 
Higher minimum wages push up real wages overall . 
Higher employer social security contributions reduce 
employment. 
Higher average disability pensions reduce the labor force . 
• Increases in the generosity of unemployment benefits 
contribute to higher unemployment by increasing the labor 
force and also help generate higher real wages . 
The liberalization of temporary contracts has dampened wage 
increases. 
Higher severance pay reduces employment . 
More labor conflicts (as measured by strike days) reduce 
employment . 
• Greater coverage of collective bargaining agreements reduces 
employment. 
Each of these effects is statistically significant . The impression that 
institutional variables are crucial to understanding the Spanish labor 
market is reinforced by the fact that the policy model equations are much 
more econometrically stable than those of the basic model. Comparing the 
basic model, run over the same sample period , with the policy model 
confirms that much of the slow adjustment captured in the basic model is 
due to the effects of the institutional variables included in the policy 
model. 
The second key insight emerging from the policy model is the lack 
of responsiveness of the Spanish labor market to traditional market 
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clearing forces. Unemployment has little effect on the decision of potential 
workers to enter the labor force, nor does it have much impact on 
moderating wages (the coefficient is significant but small) . Even more 
striking is the fact that the expected negative effect of real wages on 
employment is not strongly present. The variable has the expected 
negative sign, but it is not statistically significant . Thus, not only are 
real wages insensitive to the level of slack in the labor market, but 
employment itself does not unambiguously respond to the wage . 
As with the basic model, a number of variables were tested for 
inclusion in an attempt to capture directly the effects of macroeconomic 
shocks . The policy model is also notable as much for the variables not 
found to be significant as for those included in the chosen specification. 
Two sets of variables in particular are conspicuous by their absence. 
Beyond GDP (included in the employment equation) and productivity (in 
the wage equation), no variables related to real economic shocks were 
found to be significant in any of the equations . Neither the oil price nor 
real interest rates were found to be significant. Furthermore, a series of 
fiscal variables also proved to be insignificant in explaining Spanish 
unemployment. Regressions were run using variables representing overall 
government spending, social spending, overall taxation, and direct and 
indirect taxation. None of these variables proved significant, which 
suggests that the size of government in the economy has not in itself had 
a negative or positive effect on unemployment or wages in Spain. Of 
course, the use of the product wage in the employment equation includes 
the tax wedge, which does prove to be significant, but it is striking that 
overall fiscal pressure has no independent effect . 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND UNEMPLOYMENT : PERSISTENCE AND 
RESPONSIVENESS 
So far in this paper, the static and dynamic characteristics of each 
equation in the three-equation model have been analyzed separately. This 
exercise yields interesting information, but it ignores the possibility that 
changes in one equation could feed back into other equations in the model, 
prolonging the adjustment process. The specifications chosen for both the 
basic model and the policy model provide several channels for such 
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interequation effects: changes in employment generate effects in wages via 
the unemployment rate; changes in the labor force affect unemployment , 
which feeds into the wages ; changes in real wages could affect both the 
labor force and employment, and so on. Recognizing the endogeneity of 
GDP to this labor market model, additional avenues of feedback become 
apparent . Output and employment are simultaneously determined and , 
through labor productivity, they affect wages . To test the importance of 
these feedback effects and obtain a more complete idea of the overall speed 
of adjustment of the labor market to shocks , simulations were conducted 
for the system as a whole for both the basic and policy models following the 
methodology of Snower and Karanassou (1995 ) . 
To simulate the model as a complete system, it was necessary to 
develop a simple equation for GDP . A simple Cobb-Douglas style output 
equation was estimated as follows : 
In GDP = ao + 0 . 751n E + 0 . 251n K + alt,  ( 7 )  
where � is the capital stock and ! is a simple trend term . For the purposes 
of the simulations, increases in real wages are assumed to affect both the 
consumption wage and the level of social security contributions 
( effectively assuming that social security contribution rates remain 
constant) . 
Using this four-equation system, a shock was administered to the 
model so that the persistence and responsiveness measures for the full 
system could be observed. In these simulations the employment equation 
was shocked by 1 percent, and the Snower-Karanassou measures of 
persistence and responsiveness for the level of unemployment itself were 
calculated . For the basic model, a temporary shock yields a persistence of 
32 . 6 ,  with a half-life of 32 quarters(201. A permanent shock has a 
(20)The Snower-Karanassou persistence measure used here is slightly 
different from that used in the measures of persistence used for shocks to 
the individual equations in previous sections . See the appendix for 
details . 
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persistence measure of -1439, with a half-life of 22 quarters ( Chart 2) . 
The chart confirms that a b�bnificant proportion of the adjustment takes 
place several years after the initial shock . Indeed , for a permanent shock, 
it takes 80 quarters ( 20 years ) for 90 percent of the final impact of the 
shock to appear, while for a temporary shock it takes nearly as long--75 
quarters ( 1 8 . 7  years )(21) .  With the recovery period from shocks lasting 
considerably longer than the average business cycle , the dynamics of 
unemployment become extremely complex ,  with the unemployment effects 
of one recession beginning before the effects of the previous one have 
become fully manifest.  With this dynamic pattern, the whole concept of 
"natural" rate of unemployment can be called into question. 
The results of the basic model confirm the central assertion of this 
paper--that feedback both within and between equations produces a 
situation where the adjustment to labor market shocks is extremely slow in 
Spain . The additional delays in adjustment from the interaction among 
equations can be clearly seen by comparing the 32-quarter half-life for an 
employment shock as a whole with the 7-period half-life of a temporary 
employment shock on the employment equation alone . The shock to 
employment affects output, which feeds back to employment and wages 
( through a countercyclical increase in productivity) ;  higher wages affect 
the labor force and, through product wages , feed back into employment, 
maintaining the high unemployment rate . 
The adjustment to shocks is not only slow relative to the adjustment 
of the individual equations , it is also slow relative to other European 
countries discussed in other chapters . For a temporary shock, a 
comparison of the persistence and half-life measures with those of the 
other major European countries shows that the half-life is longer than 
those for Germany (six and a half years ) ,  Italy and the United Kingdom 
(five years) ,  and France (three years) .  The persistence measure is also 
the highest ,  tied with the United Kingdom and well above those for the 
(2\)Once again , it should be emphasized that the exact values of the 
adjustments should be treated cautiously owing to the inadequacies of the 
basic model; nevertheless, it is safe to conclude generally that adjustment 
is extremely slow and that adjustment times lengthen when interequation 
effects are taken into account . 
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other major EU countries . For a permanent shock, the same conclusion 
holds--the adjustment time for Spain is significantly longer than for the 
other major European economies .  
Turning to the policy model, there appears to be either a 
contradiction with the basic model or a marked improvement in the speed 
of adjustment of the Spanish labor market in the 1980s and early 1990s 
compared with that in the 1970s (reflected in the basic model) --a 
persistence of 1 0 . 3  with a half-life of 13 quarters for a temporary shock . 
As shown in Chart 3 ,  the pattern of both the permanent and temporary 
shock dynamics is similar to the basic model, but the size of the reactions 
is smaller and the time scale is compressed. For a permanent shock, 
responsiveness is -102 . 4 ,  with an adjustment half-life of 11 quarters . 
While it remains true that adjustment is slower for the system as a whole 
than for the individual equations ( 1 3  quarters versus 4 for the employment 
equation alone) ,  the Spanish results now compare reasonably well with 
those for the other major European countries . This does not mean that 
adjustment is quick. To achieve 90 percent recovery from a temporary 
shock, it still takes eight and a half years, while 90 percent adjustment to 
a permanent shock takes six years . 
These speeds of adjustment, while considerably faster than in the 
basic model, are slow enough that they do not alter the qualitative 
conclusions of the basic model. Furthermore , as argued above , the 
contradiction is more apparent than real . Under the policy model, 
adjustment to "equilibrium" unemployment is indeed more rapid than under 
the basic model, but it is an adjustment to an equilibrium level that is 
driven higher by the inexorable increase during the 1980s of labor market 
policies that induced unemployment to persist.  In other words, the basic 
model indicates that unemployment persists in Spainj the policy model 
indicates that this persistence is due to the persistence (and even 
increasing rigidity) of labor market institutions (including unemployment 
benefits , severance pay, minimum wages , and social contributions}(22) . 
(22)The models of the other countries used in the comparison are actually 
more similar to the basic model than to the policy model, so that the basic 
is the more appropriate reference point . 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has presented two main contentions . First, it is argued 
that the dynamics of labor market adjustment constitute an important part 
of the explanation of the size and persistence of unemployment . This is 
amply demonstrated by the results of the basic model, where an external 
shock can take eight years just for one-half of the eventual effects to 
manifest themselves--the slowest adjustment rate among major European 
countries . 
The second main conclusion points t.o the causes of this observed 
persistence in unemployment and the associated poor adjustment dynamics 
of the labor market . Profound structural changes have affected the 
economy J as have long-term sociodemographic factors (indicated by the 
significance and greater-than-unity size of the coefficient on the 
population variable) ,  as confirmed by the results obtained in the empirical 
analysis . The comparison of the basic model with the policy model 
suggests that the persistence of unemployment observed in the basic model 
is due to the persistence of certain variables linked to the structure and 
policies governing the labor market in Spain (such as labor taxation, 
replacement ratios of unemployment benefits, minimum wages , collective 
bargaining, and the share of temporary contracts) . Furthermore, the 
evidence on the importance of the policy variables in the regressions 
suggests that policies themselves have played a role not just in sustaining, 
but in generating high unemployment beyond the role of any external 
shocks . 
Only a significant change in these features of the labor market 
generating and sustaining high unemployment can lead to a substantial 
reduction in Spanish unemployment . The Government made a start in 1993-
94 with significant reforms in unemployment benefits, changes in certain 
rigidities in hiring and firing, and improvements in the flexibility in using 
the workforce. These reforms are slowly bearing fruit in terms of lower 
unemployment and more flexible real wages , but it is likely that many 
additional changes will have to be undertaken if unemploy-ment in Spain 
is to fall to the European average or below. 
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Table 1 .  Long-Run CointeQrating Regressions for the Sasic Mode l 
Labor Force Equation 
In LF 1 . 1] 7  0 . 1727 In W + 1 . 149 In WorkPop 0 . 09 0 5 6  Seasonal 
(SE) ( 0 . 23 3 6 )  ( 0 . 04 1 8 2 )  ( 0 . 13 ] )  ( 0 . 0] 5 1 )  
WALD test Xl ( ] j  147 . 0 8  ( 0 . 0000) • •  
Tests o n  the signif icance o f  each variable 
Variable F ( num, denom) Value Probabi l i  ty Unit Root t - test 
In L, F ( l ,  8 0 )  - 1316 . 2  ( 0 . 0 0 0 0 )  ..  - 3 . 8 0 0 9 -
In LW F ( 2 ,  8 0 )  - 8 . 069 [ 0 . 0 0 0 6 J  · ] . 1943 
In Work Pop F ( 2 ,  80)  . 1 1  . ] ] 2  ( O . O O O O J  3 . 7608 
COnstant F ( l ,  8 0 )  - 1 1  . 473 [ 0  . 0 011] 3 . ] 8 7 2  
Seasonal F ( ] ,  8 0 )  - 1 4 . 5 1 8  ( 0  . 0 0 0 0  J - 2 . 6 9 18 
Real wage Equation 
In w .,  ' 2 . 7 1 3  - 0 . 003419 UR + 0 . 7 19 5  In PROD + 0 . 9 247 In WMIN - 0 . 3 5 9 5  Seasonal 
(S£) ( 0 . 5 3 8 5 )  ( 0 . 0 0 1 9 9 8 )  ( 0 . 0 6 6 5 6 )  ( 0 . 0 5 8 9 7 )  ( 0 . 03 5 5 8 )  
WALD test X' (4)  ., 122 9 . 5  ( 0 . 0 0 0 0 )  * *  
TeStS on the significance o f  each variable 
variable F (nurn, denom) Value Probability Unit Root t - test 
In W F ( 2 ,  8 3 )  19 . 7 4  ( O . O O O O )  · 6 . 0076--
UR F ( l ,  8 3 )  - . 802 (0 . 05 4 6 )  · l  . 9 4 9 9  
I n  PROD F ( l ,  8 3 )  . 3 0  .207 [ 0  . D O D O )  5 . 4 961 
In ""IN F ( 2 ,  8 3 )  1 4  . 74 ( 0  . 0 0 0 0 )  5 . 427 5 
Constant F ( 1 ,  8 3 )  1 3  . 7 4 3  ( 0 .  00041 - ] . 7 0 7 1  
Seasonal F ( ] ,  8 3 )  1 7  . ] 0 4  [0  . O OOOJ  - 6 . 1 7 6 4  
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Table 1 (continued) 
Employment Equat ion 
In E = - 7 _ ) 6 6  0 _ ) ) )  In wprod + 1 . 3 1 6  I n  GDP 
(S£) ( 1 . 72))  ( 0 . 2 19 1 )  ( 0  . 1 7 1 )  
+ 0 . )2)4 Seasonal 
( 0 . 0 6 7 9 9 )  
WALD t.est X l  ( 4 )  7 7 . 3 8 4  [ 0 . 0 0 0 0 )  • •  
Tests o n  the signif icance o f  each variable 
Variable F ( num, denom) Value Probabil ity Unit Root t - test 
1n E F ( 4 ,  7 J )  - 709 . 4 5  (0 . 0 0 0 0 )  ..  - 5 . 4 854 �· 
Constant F ( t .  7 3 )  24 . 3  1 0  . 0 000] .,  . 9 295 
1n wprod F ( 2 ,  7 3 )  · 16 . 6 85 [ 0 .  0 0 00 ]  · 5  . )147 
1n GDP F ( 2 ,  7 3 )  2 1 .  05 [ 0 .  0000]  . 00 3 8  
Seasonal F ( )  , 7 3 )  1 7 . )4 ) [ 0 .  0000]  5 . 8042 
Note s :  One asterisk means signif icant. at the 5 percent. level and two 
asterisks mean significant. at the I percent level . 
BOt.h t.he signif icance tests and the C - statistics should be taken as 
only rough guides to significance, since they do not make the 
adjustments necessary for Phillips-Hansen ( 1 9 9 0 )  fully modified 
estimat.ion of cointegrat.ing relationships . 
'1 ! Calculat.ed by combining- the est.imat.es for social securit.y 
contributions and real wages . 
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Table 2 .  Basic Model Results for the Labor Force Equation, 1972 - 9 ]  
(Lags shown in parentheses) 
Variable COef ficient Standard error 
Const.ant. · 0  . 0 046171 . 0 029604 · 1  . 5 6 0  . 12 ] 0  
DIn W{l)  . 02 5 6 0 ]  . 0 094077 , . 7 2 1  . 0 0 8 1  
D1, W(3)  · 0  . 0 268]] . 0 10219 . , . 6 26 0 . 0 1 04 
DIn 1'1(4)  0 . 0 27766 . 0 10260 . , . 70 6  0 . 0 064 
DUR ( 5 ) 0 . 0 027475 0 . 0 0 0 6 0 9 1 1  - ]  . ] 9 6  0 . 0 0 1 1  
DUR ( 6 )  0 . 0 029098 0 . 0 0 0 9 6 4 0 2  2 . 9 5 7  0 . 0 0 4 1  
DIn Work Pop ( 4 )  · 1 . 1 1 4 2  0 . 52] 63 · 2 . 1 27 0 . 0367 
DIn work Pop ( 6 )  · 1 . 06 6 1  0 . 4 67 1 7  - 2 . 1 6 6  0 . 03 1 7  
Seasonal 0 . 001720] 0 .0021740 0 . 7 9 1  0 . 4 3 1 2  
Seasonal_: 0 . 016041 0 . 00 ] 9 9 1 1  4 . 019 0 . 0 0 0 1  
Seasonal-J . 0116]5 0 . 0025946 . 4 84 0 . 0 000 
LFECM( I )  - 0 . 0 5427] 0 . 025020 . , . 1 69 . 0332 
Part.Rl 
0 . 0 ] 1 0  
O . 0 8 8 8  
0 . 0 8]2 
0 . 0 6 7 9  
0 . 1 3 1 7  
0 . 1 0 ] 2  
0 . 0562 
0 . 0 5 9 3  
0 . 0 0 6 2  
0 . 17 5 ]  
0 . 2 0 9 2  
0 . 05 8 3  
Rl _ 0 . 5 8 9 6 4 4  F { l l ,  7 6 )  '" 9 . 9277 [ 0 . 0 000) 0 "' 0 . 0 0 2 6 0 9 4 6  DW = 1 . 6] 
RSS - 0 . 0 0 0 5 1 7 5 0 ] 6 1  for 12 variables and 8S observations 
AR 1 ·  5F I  5 .  1 1 )  0 . 56 1 8 6  [ 0 . 72 8 8 )  
ARCH 4 F I  4 .  6 8 )  . 0 .25429 [ 0 . 9061] 
Normal i ty X l  ( 2 )  , . 85 7  ( 0 . 2] 9 7 ]  
X '  
RESET 
NOte : 
F ( 1 9 .  5 6 )  0 . 4 6 9 0 4  [0 . 9 6 4 7 J  
F (  1 .  7 5 )  0 . 0 5 ] 1 5 8  1 0 . SIS]]  
Dependent variable is DIn LF, estimat.ed by OLS.  None of t.he 
endogenous variables was significant in contemporaneous 
variables, so t.he est. imat.ion was done with OLS rather than IV. 
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Table 3 .  Indicators of Labor Force Equation Dynamics, Basic Mode l 
wages 
Permanent shock 
Long -run elasticity - 0 . 1727 
Half . l i f e  
(quarters) 8 
Responsiveness 
(percent) - 2 . 62 
Temporary shock 
Maximum deviation - 0 . 037 
H a l f  - life 
(quarters) 5 
Persistence 
(percent) - 0 . 17 4 4  
Response of a 
Unemploy· 
ment rate 
0 
· 0 . 0028 
8 
- 38 -
Percent Shock to 
Workin9 
population 
1 . 149 
3 S  
- 1 . 059 
- 1 . 07 5  
7 
1 . 14 9  
Labor 
force 
0 
13 
· 0 . 0 2  
14 
- 1 . 0 0 9  
Table � .  Basic Model Results for the Real wage Equation, 1 9 7 2 · 9 3  
(Lags shown in parentheses) 
variable Coefficient Standard ErrOr 
Constant - 0  . 00 8 4 8 3 0  . 0 1 9 5 1 9  
Din 1II ( l }  - 0 . 3 0 033 0 . 09 9 2 2 0  
Din 111 ( 2 )  - 0  . 3 4 0 0 3  O .  1 0 5 9 6  
Din 111( 3 )  - 0 . 3 4 6 3 9  . 0 8 3 3 45 
Din PROD . 7 841 0 . 8 8210 
Din PROV ( 2 )  - 1  . 3 3 0 8  . 5 15 3 0  
Din WMIN(]) O .  1 7 3 9 8  . 06 3 8 7 5  
IIIECM(l) - 0 . 3 0 0 7 8  0 . 057241 
Seasonal - 0 .  10570 . 020 1 8 4 
Seasonal_1 0 . 09 3 0 5 1  . 03 6 6 9 3  
Seasonal-.. 0 . 037127 0 . 031524 
Note s :  o = . 0221772 Dill � 1 . 9 9  
- 0  . 4 3 5  
- 3 . 02 7  
- 3 . 2 0 9  
- ,  . 15 6  
2 . 02 3  
- 2  . 5 8 3  
2 . 7 24 
- 5  . 25 5  
- 5 . 23 7  
2 _ 536 
. 1 7 8  
t ·prob 
0 . 6 6 5 0  
0 . 0 0 3 3  
. 00 1 9  
. 0 0 0 1  
0 . 04 6 3  
0 . 0 1 1 6  
0 . 0 0 7 9  
0 . 0 0 0 0  
0 . 0 0 0 0  
0 . 0 1 3 1  
. 2423  
RSS � 0 . 04082159323 f o r  1 1  variables and 9 4  observations 
2 endogenous and 10 exogenous variables with 12 instruments 
Reduced form 0 0 . 0203942 
Specification X l  ( 1 )  . 3 1 7  [ 0 . 0 6 8 6 )  
Testing B = 0 :  X l  ( 1 0 )  - 6 1 0 . 9  [ 0 . 0 0 0 0 )  
Dependent variable is DIn III, estimated by IV. Two asterisks 
mean significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 5 .  Indicators of Real Wage Equation Dynamics, Basic Model 
permanent shock. 
LR elasticity 
Half · life 
(quarters) 
Responsiveness 
(percent) 
Temporary shock 
Maximum deviation 
Half · l i f e  
(Quarters) 
Persistence 
(percent) 
Product 
0 . 7 1 8 5  
1 3  
. 2 0 . 9 5  
- 1 . 7 6  
- 0 . 7 4 
Response of a 1 Percent Shock to 
Minimum 
waqe 
0 . 9 247 
5 
· 6 . 13 ]  
0 . 277 
' 0 . 9 2  
- 40-
Unemploy­
ment rate 
0 . 0 0] 
- 6 . 60 5  
- 0 . 00 1  
. .  0 0 ] 4  
Wages 
6 
- 6 . 62 ]  
2 
- ]  . 3 1 5  
Table 6 .  Basic Model Results for the Em�loyment Equation, 1 9 7 2 · 9 3  
(Lags shown i n  parentheses) 
variable Coef ficient Standard Error t · value 
Constant 0 . 00061231 0 .0012243 0 . 50 0  0 . 6 1 8 5  
Dln £ ( 1 )  0 . 2 7 6 5 8  0 . 0 883 0 4 . 13 2  0 . 0 025 
Dln £(6)  - 0  . 3 7 9 9 0  0 . 0 8 2 8 6 3  - . . 5 85 0 . 0000 
Dln Wprod� - 0  . 12 4 3 0  0 . 040 8 8 2 . 040 0 . 0026 
Dln Wprod (l)  * 0 . 1 5814 0 . 03 8 6 0 9  4 . 0 96 0 . 0 0 0 1  
Dln Wprod (3) � 0 . 1 3946 0 . 03 4 5 01 4 . 042 0 . 0 0 0 1  
Dln GDP . 3 6 0 8 1  . 0 8 61 0 5  . 1 9 0  0 . 00 0 1  
EmpECM( l )  - 0 . 1 0 5 8 8  0 . 013703 - 7  . 726 . 00 0 0  
Seasonal 0 _  0081766 0 . 0035076 . 3 3 1  0 . 0224 
Seasonal_1 - 0 . 0 16746 . 0 031162 . 5 . 3 74 . 00 0 0  
Seasonal ........ . 0 0 9 3 842 . 0 0 1 9 5 0 1  4 . 8 12 0 . 00 0 0  
NOte s :  0 "  0 . 0032641 DW . 1 . 72 
RSS � 0 . 0007990785297 for 12 variables and 87 observations 
3 endogenous and 1 0  exogenous variables with 19 ins truments 
Reduced form 0 0 . 00344761 
Spec i f ication Xl (7)  1 2 . 0 8 3  (0 . 0 979] 
Testing B "  0 :  X1 ( 1 1 )  .. 355 . 7 1  10 . 0000l 
Dependent variable is DIn E, estimated by IV. One asterisk means 
calculated by combining the est imates for social security 
contributions and real waQes ,  twO asterisks mean siQnificant at 
the 1 percent leve l .  
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Table 7 .  Indicators of Employment Equation Dynamics, Basic Model 
GOP 
Permanent shock 
LR elasticity 1 .  3 1 6  
Half - l i f e  
(quarters ) 
Responsiveness 
(percent) - 7 . 8 5  
TempOrary shock 
Maximum deviation 0 . 3 5  
Half - l i f e  
(quarters) 
Persistence 
(percent) 1 . 3 1 
Response of a 1 percent Shock 
Real 
wages 
1 .  078 
6 
· 9 . 8 1  
0 . 128  
7 
1 . 0 7 3  
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Social 
secu:r:ity 
taxes 
- 1 . 4 1 1  
1 . 4 1 1  
- 0 . 194 
7 
- 1 . 4 0 3  
Product 
wage 
· 0 . 3 3 3  
1 0  
- 15 . 29 
- 0 . 124 
1 1  
- 0 . 3 3 1  
Employ ' 
ment 
6 
- 9 . 43 
1 . 172 
9 . 43  
Table 8 .  Long'Run Cointegrating Regressions for the Policy Model 
In LF .. 
(5£) 
Labor Force Equation 
3 . 017 + 0 . 237 In W + 1 . 4 52 In WorkPop 
( 0 . 7 5 3 4 )  ( 0 . 107)  ( 0 . 1376) 
� 0 . 0 1 3 9 5  In RepR 
( 0 . 0 0 4 7 5 4 )  
0 . 02 5 4 8  Seasonal 
( 0 . 0 1 8 3 4 )  
WALD test x ' ( 5 )  ,. 1127 . 2  [ O . OOOOJ  
Tests o n  the signif icance of each variable 
0 . 1703 In DPens 
( 0 . 0 8 4 6 3 )  
variable F (nurn. denom) value Probability unit Root t - test 
In LF F H , 4 3 1  · 1 0 6  . 5 1  (0 . O OOOJ  · 3  . 82 B B  1/ 
Constant F { l ,  4 3 1  · 13 . 3 9 3  ( 0  . 0 00 7 J  · 3  . 65 9 6  
I n  w F ( l ,  4 3 1  · 7 . 6 4 1 4  ( 0  . 0 0 8 4  J 2 . 7 6 4 3  
I n  WorkPop F ( l .  4 3 1  1 5  . 6 8 9  ( 0  . 00 0 3 ]  3 . 9 6 0 9  
I n  PensD F ( 1 ,  4 3 1  6 . 4 561 [ 0 . 0 1 4 7 ]  · 2  . 54 0 9  
In REPR F ( l ,  4 3 1  - 4 . 72 9 1  [ 0 . 0352] 2 . 1746 
Seasonal F ( 3 ,  4 3 1  - 1 3  . 34 1  [ 0 . 0 0 0 0 1  1 . 6176 
Real Wage Equation 
In w -
(SE) 
2 . 2  
( 2 . 3 9 3 )  
0 . 0 0 4 4 0 7  UR + 0 . 8 892 I n  PROD � 0 . 3 6 8  I n  WMIN 
( 0 . 0 0 1 6 1 1 )  ( 0 . 13 )  ( 0 . 1622) 
+ 0 . 0 3123 InRepR 
( 0 . 0 0 4 9 0 6 )  
. 00 1 4 6 4  Tempshare - 0 . 0 8182 Seasonal 
( 0 . 0 0 0 5 4 2 8 )  ( 0 . 03 8 2 4 )  
WALO test x '  ( 6 )  = 1212 . 5  [ 0 . 0 0 0 0 1  
Tests o n  the s ignificance o f  each variable 
variable F (nurn, denorn) Value Probability Unit 
In w F (3 , 4 2 1  1 0 . 517 [ 0 . 0 0 0 0 1  
OR F ( 2 ,  4 2 1  1 7 . 506 [ 0 . 0 0 0 0 )  
Constant F ( l .  4 2 1  - 0 . 7 9076 [ 0 . 3 7 8 9 ]  
I n  PROD F ( l .  4 2 1  5 3 . 676 [ 0 . 0 0 0 0 ]  
In REPR F ( l .  4 2 1  - 4 0 . 2 06 [ 0 . 0 0 0 0 )  
I n  WMIN F ( 3 ,  4 2 1  1 . 86 9 8  { 0 . 1 4 9 4 }  
Tempshare F ( 1 ,  4 2 1  · 9 . 9 623 [ 0 . 0 0 3 0 )  
Seasonal F ( 3 ,  4 2 1  1 6  . 7 5 8  [O . O OOO} 
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Root t - test 
- 7 . 8 5 9 8 · *  
- 3 . 1633 
0 . 8 8 9 2 5  
7 . 32 6 4  
6 . 3 4 0 8  
2 .2322 
·3 . 1563 
· 2  . 3 6 4 1  
Table 8 (continued) 
In E 
(SE) 
WA!..O test 
Tests on 
variable 
In E 
In • 
In TSS 
In GDP 
Employment Equation 
. 2 9 8  
( 0 . 7 7 8 6 )  
0 . 1 0 1 9  In W 
( 0 . 0 8 0 8 7 )  
. 2 9 4 9  In TSS + 1 . 0 1 6 In GDP 
( 0 . 06719)  ( 0 . 0 3 5 6 1 )  
0 . 06734 In SEVER 0 . 002626 In STRIKE . 0 1571 In Coverage 
( 0 . 009573) ( 0 . 001331)  ( 0 . 0 0 2 2 6 4 )  
. 0 . 0 1 2 6 1  Seasonal 
( 0 . 02 7 3 5 )  
Xl ( 7 )  '" 1 8 2 0  . 6  [ 0 . 0 0 0 0 )  
the signif icance of each variable 
F (num, denom) value Probability 
F ( 4 ,  3 7 )  = 12 . 6 2  ( 0 . 0 0 0 0 ]  
F ( 1 ,  3 7 )  · . ]874 ( 0 . 2 4 6 4 ]  
F ( ] ,  3 7 )  · 11 .2]8 ( 0 . 0 0 0 0 ]  
F ( 1 .  3 7 )  · 34 . 9 85 ( 0 . 0 00 0 ]  
Unit ROOt t - test 
- 5 . 6 8 9 1 ·· 
- 1 . 1 779 
- 4 . 4 591 
5 . 9 14 8  
In Coverage F ( I .  3 7 )  · 14 . 2 8 6  ( 0 . 0 0 0 6 )  · 3 . 7 7 9 6  
I n  SEVER F ( l ,  3 7 )  · 1 7 . 064 ( 0 . 0 0 0 2 1  ' 4 . 1] 0 9  
In STRIKE F ( l ,  3 7 )  - 4 . 1]22 ( O . 0 4 9 ] j  - 2 . 0] 2 8  
Constant F ( l ,  3 7 )  6 . 8 657 [ 0 . 0 1 2 7 J  - 2  . 62 0 ]  
Seasonal F O , 3 7 )  6 . 92 ] ]  1 0  . 0 0 0 8 J  ' 0 . 4 4 9 4 6  
Note s ,  One asterisk means signif icant a t  the 5 percent level and two 
asterisks mean signif icant at the 1 percent level. 
Both the signif icance tests and the e - st&tistics should be taken as only 
rough guides to signif icance, since they do not make the adjustments necessary 
for Phillips- Hansen ( 1 9 9 0 )  fully modified estimation of cointegrating 
relationsh ips.  
1/ The critical value for this test i s  about 3 . 9 ,  so there is not 
conclusive evidence of cointegration. Nevertheless, the same model without 
the inclusion of the dummy variables does unambiguously cointegrate. On this 
basis, and i n  light of the characteristics of the residuals to the regression, 
cointegration is accepted. 
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Table 9 .  Policy Model Results for the Labor Force EQuation, 1 9 8 1 - 9 3  
(Lags shown in parentheses) 
Variable Coe f f i c ient Standard Error t ·value t - prob PartRI 
COnstant - 0  . 0 0 4 0 6 0 3  0 . 0 0 2 6 6 3 6  - 1  . 524 . 1 3 5 3  0 . 05 4 9  
D1n W(3)  - 0  . 03 4 8 7 8  O .  016465 - 2  . 11 8  . 04 0 4  0 . 1 0 0 9  
OUR ( 7 )  0 . 0 022275 0 . 0 012352 · 1  . 8 03 . 0 7 8 9  0 . 0752 
DUR ( 8 )  0 . 0 0 2 6 6 9 0  0 . 0 013203 2 . 02 1  0 . 05 0 0  0 . 09 2 7  
Din Work pop ( 3 )  - 2 . 4 9 7 3  0 . 6 3 07 0  - 3 . 9 6 0  0 . 0 0 0 3  0 . 2 8 16 
Di n REPR ( 3 )  . 0 018743 . 0 014415 l.  295 0 . 2028 0 . 04 0 2  
Din REPR ( 4 )  0 . 0 0 3 5 1 4 8  0 . 0 0 1 5 4 0 3  2 . 2 82 0 . 0279 0 . 1 1 5 2  
Din LPENSD - 0  . 0 53779 . 03 0 6 1 4  - , . 7 5 7  0 . 0 8 6 6  0 . 0 7 1 6  
LFECM2(1)  - 0 . 2 04 2 1  . 04 6 1 3 7  - 4 . 4 2 6  0 . 0 0 0 1  0 . 3 2 8 8  
Seasonal . 0 0 3 6 6 5 3  . 0 0 3 4 9 8 6  . 04 8  0 . 3 0 1 1  . 0 267 
Seasonal_I 0 . 0075809 0 . 0041596 1.  82) 0 . 07 5 9  0 . 0 7 6 7  
Seasonal......> 0 . 0 1 6 1 9 0  0 . 00)2696 4 . 9 5 2  0 . 0 0 0 0  0 . 3 8 0 0  
R I  - 0 . 7 3 7 5 0 6  F ( l L  4 0 )  '"' 1 0 . 2 1 7  [ 0 . 0 0 0 0 ]  0 · 0 . 00239251 D W  = 2 . 3 1  
RSS • 0 . 0 0 0 2 2 8 9 6 4 0 1 7 7  for 1 2  variables and 5 2  observations 
AR 1 ·  4 F  ( 4 .  3 6 )  0 . 9 8292 ( 0  . 4 2 9 1 ]  
ARCH 4 F ( 4 .  3 2 )  . 1 8 0 1 1  (0 . 9 470]  
Normality XI (2) 3 . 7 6 8 5  ( 0 .  1 5 1 9 ]  
x '  F ( 1 9 ,  2 0 J  0 . 5 2 6 4 1  (0 . 9 1 6 1 1  
RESET F (  
Notes : 
1 .  ' 9 )  0 . 54023 (0  . 4 6 6 7 ]  
Dependent variable is DIn LF, estimated by OLS. None of the 
endoqenous variables was s iqni f icant in contemporaneous 
variables, so the eStimation was done with OLS rather than IV. 
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Table 1 0 .  Basic Model Results for the Real Waqe Equation. 1 9 7 1 - 9 3  
(Lags shown in parentheses) 
variable Coef f icient Standard Error t · value t - prob 
COnstant . 013066 0 . 015687 0 . 83 3  . 40 9 6  
D1n W ( 3 )  · 0  . 23414 0 . 0 8 7 4 5 7  ' 2 . 67 7  . 01 0 5  
DIn W(4)  0 . 3 4 8 9 1  o . 1 0 1 5 0  3 . 4 3 B  . 00 1 3  
DIn PROD ( 3 )  · 1  . 00 4 2  0 . 5 2678 . 1 .  9 0 6  . 06 ] 5  
DUR ( l )  0 . 0 13 5 9 4  0 . 0 04 7 1 5 8  2 . 8 83 0 . 0062 
DREPR . 0 3 0 7 9 2  o . 00820]2 3 . 7 5 4  0 . 00 0 5  
DIn WMIN(2) · 0  . 3 1 8 0 6  0 . 097096 - 3 . 2 7 6  0 . 0021 
Dtempsnare ( 3 )  0 . 0 0 2 1 3 9 4  0 . 00 0 9 6 ] 7 7  2 . 2 2 0  0 . 0 3 1 9  
LWECM2 ( 1 )  - 0 . 66 0 9 0  0 .12613 · 5  . 2 4 0  0 . 0 0 0 0  
Seasonal - 0 . 06 8 1 8 4  0 . 022547 ' ) . 024 0 . 0 0 4 2  
Seasonal-l · 0  . 00 2 1 8 0 0  0 . 0222]6 ' 0 . 09 8  . 9 2 2 4  
Seasonal......1 0 . 02 9 ] 9 ]  0 . 02 0 9 2 8  1 .  4 05 0 . 1675 
R '  · 0 . 9 8 3 1 8 2  F ( l l ,  4 2 )  • 22) . 2 1  [ 0 . 0 0 0 0 ]  " • 0 . 0 1 3 2 1 9 9  DW · 
RSS - 0 . 0 0 7 3 4 0 1 2 2 7 9 2  for 12 variables and 54 observations 
AR l '  O F (  4 .  3 8 )  . 1 .  5174 [ 0  . 2 1 6 6 ]  
ARCH 4 F (  4 .  3 4 )  0 . 2 9 5 6  [ 0  . 87 8 8 ]  
Normality X� ( 2 )  . 2 8 9 4  [ 0  . 52 4 8 ]  
x '  F ( 1 9 , 22) 0 . 34 ) 8 9  ( 0 .  9 8 9 0 ]  
RESET F (  1 .  4 1 )  J .  1 9 4 9  [ 0  . 0 8 1 3 )  
PartR� 
0 . 0162 
o . 14 5 B  
0 . 2 1 9 6  
0 . 0 7 9 6  
0 . 1652 
0 . 2512 
0 . 2 0 3 5  
0 . 1 0 5 0  
0 . 3 9 5 3  
0 . 1 7 8 8  
0 . 00 0 2  
0 . 0 449 
2 . 2 3  
Note s :  Dependent variable is DIn W, estimated by O L S .  None of the endoqenous 
variables was siqnif icant in contemporaneous variables. so the 
estimation was done with OLS rather than IV. 
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Table 1 1 .  policy Model Results for the Employment Equation, 1 9 8 1 - 9 3  
(Lags shown in parentheses) 
Variable Coe f f i c ient Standard Error t · value t · prob 
constant · 0 . 00013265 0 . 0025914 - 0  . 05 1  0 . 9 5 9 5  
DIn GDP 0 . 24073 O .  1 3  816 1 . 7 4 2  0 . 0 9 1 0  
Dln GDP ( J )  · 0 . 6 16 0 8  0 . 15212 - 4 . 05 0  0 . 0 0 0 3  
Dln w · ll . 04 0 6 1 0  0 . 0 1 9 3 0 0  - 2  . 1 04 0 . 04 3 3  
Dln W I l l  0 . 0 3 5 5 5 4  0 . 0 14486 2 . 4 54 0 . 0 1 9 7  
Dln E ( l )  0 . 3 9297 . 0 8 2 8 7 1  . 7 42 0 . 0 0 0 0  
Dln E ( J )  . 21 3 7 6  . 0 94l20 . 27 1  0 . 03 0 0  
Dln E ( 6 )  - 0 . 2 4854 . 0 5 7 6 1 8  - 4 . 3 14 0 . 0 0 0 1  
Dln T55 - 0  . 26215 0 . 0 4 1 5 1 7 - ,  . 3 14 0 . 0 0 0 0  
Dln TSS ( l )  0 . 3 04 6 0  0 . 03 9 0 4 8  . 80 1  0 . 0 0 0 0  
Dln TSS () 0 . 096461 0 . 046362 2 . 0 8 1  0 . 04 5 6  
Dln TSS ( 4 )  - 0  . 1 6525 0 . 044189 · 3 . 7 4 0  0 . 0 0 0 7  
Dln STRIKE (2)  - 0 . 0 0 0 9 5 6 4 0  0 . 00033149 · 2 . 8 8 5  0 . 0069 
Dln STRIKE ( 4 )  0 . 0014214 0 . 00033737 4 . 2 1 3  0 . 00 0 2  
DIn COVER ( l )  ' 0 . 0094967 0 . 0024831 · 3 . 82 5  0 . 0 006 
EmpECM2 ( 1 )  · 0 . 44459 0 . 052754 · 8 . 4 2 8  0 . 0000 
Seasona 1 ' 0 . 0 089656 0 . 0045113 · 1 . 9 8 7  0 . 0555 
Seasonal_1 0 . 0 1 3 9 1 6  0 . 004l862 3 . 324 . 0 022 
Seasona l_. 0 . 0 0 7 3 7 5 6  0 . 0 0 1 9 3 8 5  3 . 8 0 5  0 . 0 006 
Additional instruments used: 
DIn SEVER DIn TSS (2)  Dln GDP ( l )  DIn COVER DIn £(5)  D I n  10'(2) 
Dln 10'(3)  DlnSeVER ( l )  
0 - 0 . 00176B2) D W  =- 2 . 0 2 
RSS . 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 0 05224) for 19 variables and 51 observations 
NOtes : 
3 endogenous and 17 exogenous variables with 25 instruments 
Reduced form 0 - 0 . 00155))4 
Specificat ion X l ( 6 )  = 
Testing B = 0 :  Xl ( 1 8 ) =-
1 0 . 5 8 7  [ 0 . 1020] 
1 1 5 7 . B [ 0 . 0 0 0 0 )  
Testing for error autocorrelation from lags 1 t o  4 
X l { 4 )  "" 1 . 4 6 9 2  [ 0 . 83 2 1 )  
I V  error autocorrelation 
Lag 1 
Coeff . · 0 . 0 5 5 3 8  
coef ficients: 
Lag 2 Lag ) 
0 . 1402 · 0 . l B66 
ARCH 4 F{ 4, 241  
Normality Xl ( 2 ) �  
. 9 4 2 6 4  [ 0 . 4 5 6 4 ]  
. 4 0163 { O . BIBI] 
La9 4 
- 0 . 14 2 6  
Dependent variable is DIn E ,  est imated b y  IV. Two asterisks 
mean significant at the 1 percent level . 
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Table 1 2 .  Indicators o f  Labor Force Equation Dynamics. policy Model 
Response of a Percent shock to 
Wages 
permanent shock 
LR elasr.icity 0 . 2 3 7  
Half - life 
(quarters) 6 
Responsiveness 
(percenr.) - 5 . 62 
Temporary shock 
Maximum deviation 0 . 04 82 
Half - life 
(quarters) 7 
Persistence 
(in percent) 0 . 236 
Unemploy-
menr. rate 
o . 0 0 3 1  
1 0  
7 - 1 0  • 
Working 
population 
1 .  452 
11 
-13 . 3  
- 2 . 2 7  
a 
1 .  4 7 8  
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Replace­
menr. ratio 
- 0 . 3 3 3  
1 0  
- 1 5 . 29 
- 0 . 124 
11 
- 0 . 3 3 1  
Pension 
· 0 . 17 
- 3 . 35 
- 0 . 054 
, 
- 0 . 169 
Labor 
force 
- 4 . 9 1  
1 
4 . 8 8 7  
Table 1 3 .  Indicators of Real Waqe Equation Dynamics, Policy Model 
Response of a Percent Shoc� to 
Permanent shock 
LR elasticity 
Half - life 
(quarters) 
Responsiveness 
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APPENDIX . SIMPLE MEASURES OF "CROSS-PERSISTENCE" AND 
"CROSS-RESPONSIVENESS" 
Snower and Karanassou ( 1 995) define unemployment persistence as 
the sum of the deviations of unemployment from its initial value from an 
employment shock as follows: 
where OEo is the shock in period O. To obtain a measure of persistence for 
shocks in explanatory variables , this indicator must be modified, be?BUSe 
it is unclear what the denominator would be because the shock is the 
domain of a variable different from the reaction. To solve this , it is 
normalized by the equilibrium value of the dependent variable rather than 
by the shock itself. Thus , the cross-persistence measure of deviations in 
the dependent variable, Y." owing to a shock in variable �, is as follows: 
n,. 
- I 
_ "("" y,-y, 
- L.. -- ' 
hI Yo 
where Yo is the value of the dependent variable before the shock to � .  
Where persistence is measured due to a shock in the dependent variable, 
nr.v is related to Snower-Karanassou persistence ( ns,t) by the following 
relationship : 
n,,= {  (y,-y,) IY,}n, • .  
For responsiveness to a permanent shock, the Snower-Karanassou 
measure is 
where u" bar is the long-run equilibrium value . Here again, the Snower­
Karanassou measure has to be modified to measure the cross­
responsiveness effect of one variable on another, although here the 
- 54 -
modification is more minor. The difference between the initial and final 
equilibrium values is used to normalize as follows : 
- /I � 
= L y, -y . 
r=O Yo-yr 
For responsiveness to shocks in the dependent variable in a single­
equation error correction model, this measure would be identical to the 
corresponding Snower-Karanassou responsiveness measure (although this 
might not be true for a system of equations where feedback effects from 
other equations could cause the long-run change in the dependent variable 
to be larger than the shock . 
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